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CRIME AND IMMIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE IMMIGRANTWAVES
Brian Bell, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin*
Abstract—This paper focuses on empirical connections between crime and
immigration, studying two large waves of recent U.K. immigration (the
late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers and the post-2004 inflow from EU
accession countries). The first wave led to a modest but significant rise in
property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact. There
was no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes
in crime cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. The findings are
consistent with the notion that differences in labor market opportunities of
different migrant groups shape their potential impact on crime.
I. Introduction
MANY media and social commentators posit there tobe a direct connection between immigration and
crime. However, this is a key issue on which there is only a
sparse academic literature (for notable exceptions, see the
U.S. papers by Butcher & Piehl, 1998a, 1998b, 2005, and
the Italian paper by Bianchi, Buonanno, & Pinotti, 2012).1
This contrasts starkly with the by now very large literature
on the labor market effects of immigration (see Borjas,
1999, or Card, 2005).
In this paper, we study possible crime effects from two
recent large flows of immigrants entering the U.K. econ-
omy. These large flows offer an opportunity for careful
appraisal as to whether the populist view that immigrants
cause crime is borne out by rigorous evidence. We are able
to exploit the fact that the two flows were very different in
nature, in particular in their incentive to engage in criminal
activities.2
The first immigrant flow we consider is the late 1990s and
early 2000s wave of asylum seekers, which we refer to as
the asylum wave. The second is the large inflow of workers
from EU accession countries—the A8 wave—that occurred
from 2004 onward. As we will demonstrate, connections of
these two flows to the labor market are very different. As
labor market opportunities on offer are a key determinant of
criminal behavior in the standard economic model of crime
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), we develop our empirical
tests in this light. In particular, labor market opportunities
available to the asylum wave are much worse than for both
natives and the A8 wave, making the net returns to criminal
activity likely to be different. We therefore hypothesize that
crime effects are more likely in the case of the former.
Our evidence supports this way of analyzing the crime-
immigration relationship. For the asylum wave, we report
evidence of a higher incidence of property crime induced by
the immigration flow. The A8 wave sees the opposite effect.
There is also no observable impact on violent crime for
either wave. Evidence from victimization data suggests that
the changes in crime rates that occurred during the immi-
grant waves cannot be ascribed to crimes against immi-
grants, while data on incarceration corroborate the view that
any immigrant-induced rise in crime is associated only with
the first wave. This leads us to an overall conclusion that
focusing on the limited labor market opportunities of asylum
seekers could have a beneficial crime reduction effect.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
describes the two migration waves in more detail and pre-
sents some summary statistics on their characteristics rela-
tive to both natives and other immigrants. Section III pre-
sents our main results. We exploit local area-level data on
crime rates and migrants to estimate panel models of the
relationship between recorded crime and the immigration
waves. Section IV compares arrest rates for the A8 immi-
grant group with natives, gives evidence on immigrant-
native differences in rates of incarceration, and presents
findings from the victimization analysis. Section V offers
an interpretation of the results, connecting them to the stan-
dard Becker/Ehrlich economics of crime model. Finally,
section VI offers some conclusions.
II. Immigration to the United Kingdom since 1997:
A Tale of Two Waves
We begin by describing the evolution of immigration in
the United Kingdom over the past few decades, paying parti-
cular attention to the large flows since 1997, a period notable
for the vast inflow of migrants relative to previous experi-
ence. We show that two particular waves of immigration into
the United Kingdom since this date have been major contri-
butors to the overall rise. Interestingly, they have very differ-
ent characteristics and motivations for migrations. This
makes them a natural focal point for analysis and for testing
whether immigrant flows have an impact on crime.
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1 Indeed, in the United Kingdom, the context we study, there is no evi-
dence at all. The only quantitative evidence of which we are aware is con-
tained in the unpublished MSc dissertation by Pearse (2009).
2 Heterogeneity in migration flows from refugees and economic
migrants to the United States is stressed in Cortes (2004), who demon-
strates significant variation in labor market attachment and earnings, and
assimilation, of these groups.
3 See Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2010) for evidence that granting legal
status to migrants—by opening up better labor market opportunities for
them—reduces their recidivism rate.
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The pattern of immigration over the recent past is shown in
figure 1. This plots the stock of immigrants each year over the
period 1997 to 2009, together with the number of reported
violent and property crimes. In 1981, the stock of immigrants
was 3.2 million, this rose only to 4.1 million by 1997. Since
then, the stock has risen to 6.9 million. The figure shows a
sharp rise in immigration flows since 1997. In other words,
fully three-quarters of the rise in the stock of immigrants over
the past thirty years has occurred since 1997, and this is the
only period during which the change in migration over-
whelmed the natural change in the population. We think this
gives us a credible setting for empirically studying the crime-
immigration relationship. To see how, we turn to a closer
examination of the immigration flows since 1997.
The first flow we concentrate on is the large rise in the
number of asylum seekers arriving in the United Kingdom.
Asylum flows to industrialized countries rose in the 1990s
and early 2000s, with peaks in 1992 and 2001 (Hatton, 2009).
The first peak was associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall
and civil war in the former Yugoslavia; and Germany was the
principal destination country. The second peak, which we
focus on in this paper (as flows to the United Kingdom were
much larger), was associated with wars and country break-
downs such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.
While the increased flow of asylum seekers occurred in
many industrialized countries, the numbers seeking asylum
in the United Kingdom were very large relative to both pre-
vious application trends and other forms of immigration.
The United Kingdom was the second-highest recipient in
the world of asylum seekers over this period, for instance,
receiving almost twice as many as the United States. Figure
2 plots the number of applications for asylum in each year
from 1993 to 2008. The sharp increase after 1997 is clear,
as is the subsequent deceleration after 2002. The average
number of new applications for asylum in the five years
prior to 1997 was 31,000. In the five years after 1997, this
rose to 71,000. At their peak, asylum seekers accounted for
over 20% of all non-British migrants entering the United
Kingdom.4
Most of the migrants associated with the first flow are ulti-
mately denied leave to remain in the United Kingdom. On
average during this period, around 70% of asylum seekers
had their claim rejected or withdrawn. In this paper, we focus
on the stock of asylum seekers rather than the subsequent
smaller stock of successful asylum applicants. We do so for
three reasons. First, as most asylum applicants are eventually
denied, it would make little sense to focus only on the subset
of successful applicants. Second, as a practical matter, we
have data on the geographical location of asylum seekers
only while their claim is being assessed or appealed. Third,
the identification strategy we use relies on the dispersal pol-
icy adopted for asylum seekers. Successful applicants are no
longer subject to these restrictions. It is a subject for future
research to examine the performance of successful asylum
seekers in the labor market and their impact on crime.5
FIGURE 1.—IMMIGRATION STOCK AND CRIME TRENDS, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1997–2009
4 A detailed discussion of the causes of the rise and fall of asylum flows is
provided by Hatton (2009).
5 Edin, Fredriksson, and A˚slund (2003) examine the economic success
of refugee immigrants in Sweden, where a dispersal policy similar to that
used in the United Kingdom was used. Their data do not identify refugee
immigrants separately from other immigrants, so their identification relies
on country of origin and year of arrival. Such an empirical strategy for the
United Kingdom would be ineffective. Suppose we take all identified
countries of origin that contributed asylum seekers between 1997 and
2003. Over the period, 412,000 asylum applications were made from
these countries (95% of the total). We know that the ultimate acceptance
rate was around 30%, implying around 125,000 applicants would be
allowed to remain permanently in the United Kingdom. If we assume that
all of these successful applicants remained in the United Kingdom, we
can compare this figure to the size of the immigrant population in 2008
for these countries of origin who arrived as adults between 1997 and
2003. The Annual Population Survey gives an estimate of 634,000. So
using country of origin and year of arrival to try and identify asylum
immigrants would falsely identify around 80% of cases. Even if we
restrict the sample to the largest five countries of origin, the error rate
would still be around 50%. This highlights the fact that the majority of
foreign migrants to the United Kingdom do not arrive as asylum seekers,
even from countries that generate many asylum applicants.
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The second flow we consider is rather different. This big
inflow occurred because of the opening up of the U.K. labor
market to citizens of eight countries that joined the EU in
2004. These accession countries (the so-called A8) were
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, and Estonia. At the time of accession, current
EU members were allowed to decide whether to grant
immediate access to their labor markets or maintain barriers
to the free movement of labor. The United Kingdom, along
with Ireland and Sweden, chose to open up the labor market.
The impact on the labor market has been comprehensively
analyzed by Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009). Our focus
is simply on the size of the subsequent immigrant flow. Fig-
ure 2 shows the number of Worker Registration Scheme
(WRS) applications from A8 migrants for each year since
2004.6 Clearly the flows associated with this immigrant
wave dominate the inflows of migrants over the period,
accounting for almost 50% of such inflows at their peak.
The characteristics of the two immigrant waves are very
different (a feature we return to in section V when consider-
ing the interpretation of the results we report and their theo-
retical underpinning). To provide some illustration of the
characteristics of the two waves, tables 1A and 1B report
some summary statistics from cross-section surveys for the
two waves and for all other immigrants and for natives. Few
data sets in the United Kingdom explicitly identify asylum
seekers. For table 1A, we use the 2004 New Deal for Com-
munities Evaluation Survey, which asks all respondents
whether they entered the United Kingdom as refugees. The
sample for this survey covers disadvantaged areas around
the United Kingdom, so the data tend to show higher unem-
ployment rates and lower wages than would be true for the
whole country, but with these data, we are able to compare
asylum seekers with natives and nonasylum immigrants
within the same areas. The data for the A8 wave come from
the nationally representative Labour Force Survey.
FIGURE 2.—ASYLUM APPLICATIONS AND WORKER REGISTRATION SCHEME REGISTRATIONS, 1993–2008
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
A. Asylum Wave Statistics
British
Immigrant
Non-Asylum
Immigrant
Asylum
% Male 49.6 53.9 60.4
Age 40.9 37.7 35.2
% with Children 40.4 43.5 52.7
% Single Person 21.9 15.9 18.4
% No Qual 38.4 32.2 51.7
% Degree 3.6 6.5 4.1
% Poor English - 9.8 32.3
Participation rate 60.4 62.3 48.6
Unemployment rate 14.7 17.7 32.7
Annual Mean wage (£) 16,267 15,543 12,672
Annual Median wage (£) 14,300 13,000 10,400
Sample size 8,063 3,385 514
B. A8 Wave Statistics
British
Immigrant
Non-A8 Wave
Immigrant
A8 Wave
% Male 49.6 49.3 54.6
Age 41.3 38.0 28.7
% White 93.1 65.0 93.7
% Married 52.3 53.2 35.7
% No Children 59.7 59.3 70.5
% Degree 15.3 16.1 7.2
Years of School 12.5 13.8 14.8
Participation rate 77.6 71.9 89.0
Employment rate 73.9 66.8 83.5
Mean weekly wage £423 £432 £268
Median weekly wage £350 £346 £242
Sample size 398,113 42,551 2,045
Table 1A: Data are tabulated from the 2004 Household Survey Data of the National Evaluation of the
New Deal for Communities Programme. British are all those who identify themselves as British, and asy-
lum are those who entered the United Kingdom as refugees. Sample are all heads of household aged 18
to 65, and all results are weighted to reflect the population in the selected areas.
Table 1B: Data are tabulated from the Labour Force Survey, spring quarters 2004–2009. British are all
British citizens, A8 wave are all observations where country of birth is one of the A8 countries and year
of arrival in the United Kingdom was 2004 or later, and non-A8 wave are all other non-British. Sample
are all aged 18 to 65 and results are weighted using population weights.
6 Workers coming to the United Kingdom from A8 countries were
required to register on the WRS. More details are provided in the online
appendix.
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A number of observations can be made regarding the
characteristics of the two waves. First, immigrants in both
waves were younger and more likely to be male than
natives. Both immigrant waves tend to have lower educa-
tional qualifications than natives.7 Second, individuals in
the A8 wave were much more likely to be single and have
no dependent children compared to natives, other immi-
grants, and the asylum wave. This is consistent with the
general impression that the A8 wave was dominated by
young people coming to take up employment rather than
for family relocation. Further support for this is shown by
the participation and employment rates for this wave, which
are higher than for natives. In contrast, the asylum wave has
low participation rates and unemployment rates that are
twice as high as for natives.8 It is clear that the first wave
has experienced very poor employment outcomes, while
the second wave has the opposite experience. Wages tend
to be low for both waves, though some of the wage disad-
vantage for the A8 wave can be explained by the lower
average age of this group.9
Two broad conclusions follow from the discussion in this
section. First, the rate of immigration into the United King-
dom was relatively smooth in the decades prior to 1997.
Since then, the flows have been much more rapid. They
were dominated first by the flow of asylum seekers, then by
the flow of A8 workers. Second, the characteristics and out-
comes, particularly in the labor market, of these two waves
are starkly different. These differences will be crucial in
examining whether there are links between immigration
and crime.
III. Longitudinal Models of Crime and Immigration
In this section, we report results from estimating panel
data models of the relationship between immigrant shares
and recorded crime.10 Our basic estimating equation takes
the form
DðCrime=PopÞit ¼ b1DðMigrants=PopÞit þ b2DlnðPopÞit
þ b3DXit þ Tt þ eit; ð1Þ
where Crime is the number of notified offenses, Pop is the
resident adult population, Migrants is either the number of
asylum seekers or the number of A8 immigrants, X denotes
possible local area control variables such as the percentage
of the population claiming welfare benefits and the share of
young adults in the population, and T denotes a set of time
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the local author-
ity level in the reported tables of results. In some specifica-
tions, we include dummies for each of the 43 police force
areas (PFA). Since we are estimating a first-difference
model, this controls for area-specific time trends. Since
decisions on policing priorities, staffing, and so on are
decided at the PFA level, the inclusion of such dummies
controls for variations over time in the effect of such deci-
sions on crime trends. In all cases, we also report results
without the inclusion of such dummies.
For the immigrant waves, we have administrative data
measured at the local authority (LA) level across England
and Wales. We have 371 LAs that can be consistently iden-
tified over our sample period, with an average adult popula-
tion of roughly 120,000. Annual crime rates are split into
two broad categories: violent and property offenses. The
crime data are measured consistently across LAs only from
2002, which therefore defines the starting date of our analy-
sis. Full details of all data and sources are provided in the
online Appendix.
For both waves, we can measure the number of immi-
grants using administrative data that cover the entire popu-
lation of interest rather than rely on sample surveys. For the
asylum wave, we have annual data on the stock of asylum
applicants in each LA from 2001. The data begin in 2001,
the first year that a national dispersal policy for asylum
applicants was implemented and data at the local authority
level were collected. The flow of immigrants associated
with the A8 accession is measured using administrative data
from the WRS. A8 migrants registered on the WRS when
they first arrived in the United Kingdom. The WRS mea-
sures only the inflow of workers and so is not the stock of
A8 workers at any point in time. Thus, we cumulate the
data over time to approximate the stock.11 The data are
available at the LA level from May 2004 on an annual
basis. Figures 3A and 3B show the distribution of the two
7 Closer inspection of the numbers in table 1B reveals that the A8
migrants are less likely to have a university degree than natives, but they
have more reported years of schooling. This latter result is simply a func-
tion of a later compulsory school-leaving age. Given the average age of
the A8 migrants, many are likely to return to higher education in the
future.
8 Poor labor market performance relative to natives is a feature of asy-
lum seekers who were relocated to other countries. For example, the Edin
at al. (2003) analysis of refugee immigrants in Sweden shows them to
have significantly lower employment rates as compared to Swedish-born
individuals.
9 Half of the wage difference between A8 migrants and natives is
explained by age, educational qualifications, and sex in a standard wage
regression. The low levels of wages for A8 migrants observed in the LFS
are consistent with the self-reported wage rates in WRS registrations. In
2008, 93% reported earning an hourly wage below £8.
10 In an earlier version of the paper, we used survey data (Labour Force
Survey and Annual Population Survey) aggregated to area level to con-
sider the relationship between the total immigrant population and crime;
we found no significant effect. However, using survey data to estimate the
stock of immigrants at lower-level geographies, such as local authorities,
may introduce substantial attenuation bias (see Aydemir & Borjas, 2011).
This reinforces the benefit of focusing on the two immigrant waves for
which we have accurate administrative data on migrant stocks.
11 There is a natural concern that differential rates of out-migration
across local authorities by A8 immigrants would result in the cumulated
inflow measure having a poor relationship to the true stock. To examine
this, we have compared the flows from the WRS data with the change in
the stock estimates from the Annual Population Survey. To achieve rea-
sonable sample sizes of A8 citizens, we estimate APS stocks at the level
of Police Force Area (42 areas) and aggregate the WRS data to the same
level. We then regress the WRS flows on the change in APS stocks over
the period 2004–2008 with time dummies included. The coefficient on
the APS stocks is 0.97 with a t-statistic of 10 and an R2 of 0.77, suggest-
ing a fairly tight correspondence between the WRS flows and the stock
changes.
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immigrant waves across England and Wales. The asylum
wave migrants are very unevenly distributed because of the
dispersal policy that operated (which we discuss in more
detail below), and a large number of local authorities had
no exposure. In contrast, the A8 wave is more evenly dis-
tributed, though with pockets of larger concentrations.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (1) for
both waves.12 For violent crime, we find no significant rela-
tionship for either immigrant wave. The estimated coeffi-
cients are always small, and the picture is unchanged
whether we include a set of local control variables (column
2) or whether we also include a set of PFA dummies to con-
trol for time trends at the level of police force areas
(column 3).
The results for property crime are very different. Column
4 shows a significant positive relationship between the
asylum wave and property crime rates. In contrast, the coef-
ficient on the A8 wave is negative, though small and insig-
nificant. Adding local controls (column 5) marginally shar-
pens these estimates, though they remain essentially the
same. There is a positive effect on property crime from hav-
ing more welfare benefit claimants in the area and a surpris-
ingly negative effect from a rising youth share. Finally, in
column 6, we include PFA dummies to control for PFA-
level time trends in property crime. This marginally reduces
the size of the coefficient on the asylum wave, but it
remains positive and significant. Interestingly, the coeffi-
cient on the A8 wave now becomes slightly more negative
and significant (but is still an order of magnitude smaller
than the coefficient on the asylum wave). The negative
effect of the youth share loses its significance in this final
specification. Thus, the broad conclusion from these results
is that neither wave was associated with any significant
change in violent crime, while the asylum wave was asso-
ciated with a rise in property crime and the A8 wave with a
small fall. As we shall discuss in section V, these differen-
tial responses are consistent with the theoretical predictions
of a standard crime decision model.
As a robustness check, online appendix table 1 reports
the full set of results from table 2 but with equation (1) rees-
timated as a within-group fixed-effect panel model rather
than in first differences. We again find that with local con-
trols, there is no significant relationship between either
immigrant wave and violent crime rates, though the point
estimate for the asylum wave switches signs but remains
close to 0. For the property crime models, we again find a
FIGURE 3.—DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS ACROSS ENGLAND AND WALES
12 We report results controlling for population, welfare benefit clai-
mants, and the share of young adults in the population. We have experi-
mented with various other controls such as the local unemployment rate
and local wages, but these were always less significant than the reported
controls, and their inclusion did not affect the coefficients on the immi-
grant variables.
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significant positive effect for the asylum wave, which is
somewhat larger than in the first-difference model. Again,
the A8 wave is associated with a smaller but still significant
fall in property crime. Thus, our broad conclusion is robust
to consideration of this alternative econometric specifica-
tion.
We now turn to the fact that so far, we have treated the
migrant location of the two waves as exogenous. This will
of course potentially bias our estimates of the coefficient of
interest. For example, if immigrants choose to locate in
areas experiencing low crime growth, this would bias down
estimates of the causal effect of immigrants on crime. Such
an effect might work directly—immigrants find out where
low crime areas are—or indirectly—immigrants move to
areas with good employment prospects that also produce
lower crime rates. A bias in the opposite direction instead
would be expected if migrants move to areas with increas-
ing crime rates (because, for instance, they are attracted by
falling housing prices). The recent literature on the impact
of immigration on receiving countries has generally
addressed this identification issue by either devising suitable
instruments (Card, 2001) or exploiting some natural experi-
ment where immigrants were forcibly allocated to areas they
had not chosen (Edin, Fredriksson, & A˚slund, 2003; Gould,
Lavy, & Paserman, 2004; Glitz, 2012; Damm, 2009). We
exploit a dispersal policy for the asylum seekers wave and
will employ an instrumental variable strategy based on the
past settlement of immigrants for the A8 wave.
Asylum seekers requiring accommodation are allocated
to a location by the National Asylum Support Service
(NASS). The NASS sought local authorities that were will-
ing to provide accommodation, possibly because they had
spare social housing, and also used private sector accommo-
dation. NASS operated a dispersal policy that sought
to locate asylum seekers across the country in a large num-
ber of locations and explicitly excluded London. The asy-
lum seeker had no choice as to the destination to which he
or she was sent and would often have no ties of any type to
the area.13 The evidence shows that the sample of local
authorities that received asylum seekers under the dispersal
policy were more deprived than average. There were 148
local authorities that had some asylum seekers provided
with accommodation by NASS at some point since 2001
and 223 with no dispersal allocations.14 Table 3 provides
some summary statistics on the differences between the two
groups. For our purposes, the level of crime in a local
authority is not relevant since we estimate first-difference
models. Therefore, the simple fact that asylum seekers were
disproportionately sent to deprived areas with higher crime
rates does not mechanically produce a positive relationship
between changes in asylum stocks and changes in crime
rates. Of more concern would be if we found that the
growth rate in crime before the dispersal policy began was
different between those areas that were designated by
NASS and those that were not. As the final rows of table 3
show, there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case.
We can therefore directly exploit this exogenous variation
in location by instrumenting the total number of asylum see-
kers in each local area by the number of those in dispersal
accommodation. Columns 1 to 3 of table 4 report the instru-
mental variable (IV) results.15 The violent crime effect
remains insignificant and close to 0. For property crime, the
results are very similar to the OLS results in table 2. In our
preferred specification, where we control for PFA dummies
TABLE 2.—PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR IMMIGRANT WAVES
Violent Violent Violent Property Property Property
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Asylum/Pop) 0.027 0.029 0.090 1.141*** 1.221*** 0.930***
(0.162) (0.164) (0.191) (0.330) (0.302) (0.325)
D(A8/Pop) 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.034 0.043 0.061**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Dln(Pop) 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
D(Benefit Rate) 0.004 0.054 0.141*** 0.131***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036)
D(Young Share) 0.026 0.035 0.112*** 0.062
(0.020) (0.021) (0.039) (0.033)
Year dummies x x x x x x
PFA dummies x x
Sample size 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591
p(Asylum ¼ A8) 0.817 0.84 0.660 0.001 0.000 0.003
R2 0.239 0.242 0.276 0.179 0.209 0.288
Regressions are run over the period 2002–2009. The dependent variable is D(Number of Crimes Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the local authority level. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
13 The 1999 act required that in providing accommodation to asylum
seekers, the secretary of state must have regard to the ‘‘desirability, in
general, of providing accommodation in areas in which there is a ready
supply of accommodation.’’ Furthermore, the act explicitly states that
regard may not be given to ‘‘any preference that the supported person or
his dependents (if any) may have as to the locality in which the accommo-
dation is to be provided’’ (s97).
14 We also experimented with defining an asylum dispersal area as any
local authority that accommodated more than five asylum applicants
under the dispersal program at any point between 2001 and 2008 to
remove very small allocations. This would result in 31 local authorities
being redefined as nondispersal areas. Our results are robust if we adopt
this alternative definition.
15 Online appendix table A2 reports the IV first-stage regressions.
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(column 3), the coefficient on the asylum wave is 1.089. This
compares with 0.930 in the OLS specification. It is natural to
wonder why the IV and OLS estimates are so similar. The
simple reason is that during the period considered, over 80%
of the new asylum seekers were dispersed, so the OLS esti-
mates essentially already incorporate much of the exogene-
ity generated by the dispersal program. This can be seen by
both the strength of the first-stage regression and the coeffi-
cient on the dispersal share, which is almost exactly 1.16
Analyzing the results of the IV regressions separately for
male and female asylum seekers (table 5) provides further
confirmation that selective choice of dispersal locations by
the authorities does not mechanically lead to our findings.
If it were the case that the authorities had chosen, by acci-
dent or design, dispersal locations that were about to experi-
ence a relative increase in crime, we should see the coeffi-
cient of the female asylum stock also being positive. There
is no evidence to suggest that male and female asylum see-
kers were systematically sent to very different dispersal
locations, with the cross-section correlation between num-
bers of male and female migrants at each location being
0.84, and females account for around 45% of the total stock.
However, we find no significant effect from the female asy-
lum stock on crime in any specification, while a signifi-
cantly positive effect on property crime is always obtained
if we focus on male asylum seekers only.
In contrast to the asylum wave, the A8 migrants could
choose to live and work anywhere in the United Kingdom.
Thus, for them, we are not able to as precisely control for
endogenous location choice as with the asylum wave. Fol-
lowing Altonji and Card (1991), spatial correlation analyses
TABLE 4.—IV PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR IMMIGRANT WAVES
Violent Property Property Violent Property Property
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Asylum/Pop) 0.026 1.776*** 1.089**
(0.263) (0.454) (0.459)
D(A8/Pop) 0.074 0.215** 0.386***
(0.096) (0.102) (0.081)
Dln(Pop) 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.015** 0.038*** 0.049***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
D(Benefit Rate) 0.004 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.002 0.048 0.020
(0.024) (0.034) (0.036) (0.028) (0.037) (0.033)
D(Young Share) 0.026 0.116*** 0.060 0.021 0.040 0.021
(0.020) (0.039) (0.033) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
Year dummies x x x x x x
PFA dummies x x
Sample size 2,591 2,591 2,591 1,849 1,849 1,849
R2 0.242 0.203 0.286 0.073 0.068 0.093
Regressions are run over the period 2002–2009 for the asylum wave and 2004–2009 for the A8 wave. The dependent variable is D(Number of Crimes Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by
adult population. The instrumental variables are the number of asylum seekers in dispersal accommodation for the asylum wave and the supply-push instrument for the A8 wave. The F-statistic on the first stage IV is
1,522 (p ¼ 0.000) in the asylum regression with PFA dummies and 12.8 (p ¼ 0.000) in the A8 regressions with PFA dummies (see online appendix table A2). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local
authority level. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
TABLE 3.—SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISPERSAL AND NONDISPERSAL AREAS, 2001
All
Areas
Dispersal
Areas
Nondispersal
Areas
t-Test of Difference
in Means
Unemployment rate 3.6 3.9 2.6 9.9***
Benefit claimant rate 11.0 12.6 8.7 7.9***
Youth share 15.0 16.3 13.3 11.3***
Vacant housing rate 3.2 3.4 3.0 1.8
Social housing rate 19.2 22.6 14.6 9.0***
Immigrant share 9.1 12.2 4.8 8.7***
% with no qualifications 29.1 30.0 27.9 2.4**
Total crime rate 5.2 6.7 3.2 14.4***
Violent crime rate 1.5 1.9 1.1 9.6***
Property crime rate 3.6 4.8 2.1 14.5***
Prior D total crime rate 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.8
Prior D violent crime rate 0.13 0.12 0.14 1.3
Prior D property crime rate 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.1
Sample size 371 148 223
The change in crime rates is the two-year change between 1999 and 2001. All figures are weighted by adult population in the local authority. Dispersal areas as defined as those that accommodated any asylum see-
kers under the dispersal program between 2001 and 2009. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
16 Our findings are substantially unaffected if we restrict our estimating
sample to the asylum dispersal areas. Moreover, we have explored the
robustness of our results when we explicitly control for the pretreatment
differences between asylum dispersal and nondispersal areas. We estimate
propensity score models to predict whether a local authority is a dispersal
area based on 2001 local area characteristics. These characteristics
include information on the housing stock, economic activity, welfare ben-
efits, education, and population. We then reestimate our models on either
the subset of local authorities for which there is common support in the
propensity score or matched local authorities. Over various specifications
of the propensity score model, we find that the coefficient on the asylum
wave remains the same sign and order of magnitude as in the IV regres-
sions of table 4, though significance in the property crime regression at
the 5% level depends on the exact set of variables included in the propen-
sity score model.
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of migrant impact on different host country outcomes have
often made use of a supply-push component instrument.17
The instrument is based on the persistence of location
choices of immigrants in host countries: the initial distribu-
tion of migrants (by country of origin) across different areas
and the current national inflows are used to obtain an exo-
genous predicted migrant share, which is then used to
instrument the actual one. In our case, the instrument is
generated using the distribution of each A8 nationality in
each local authority in 2001 (using the full 100% Census
sample) and the subsequent national flow of A8 migrants
by nationality.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 4 show the IV results for the A8
wave. The effect on violent crime remains close to 0 and insig-
nificant. When we look at property crime, the coefficient
becomes substantially more negative and significant. This
remains the case even when we control for police force area
trends in property crime. So in sharp contrast to the asylum
wave, the A8wave if anything tended to generate falls in prop-
erty crime. The first-stage regression shows that the instrument
is positively correlated with changes in the A8 stock, with an
F-statistic of 13 (see online appendix table A2).18
Our conclusions from this analysis are straightforward.
There appears to be a significant positive effect from the
asylum wave on property crime. In contrast, the evidence
points to a negative effect from the A8 wave. The effect on
violent crime is indistinguishable from 0 for both waves. It
is natural to ask about the size of the property crime effects
we find for the asylum and A8 wave. To give a sense of the
magnitude on crime rates, consider the estimated coeffi-
cients from columns 3 and 6 of table 4. These give values
of 1.09 and –0.39 on the migrant/population variable in the
property crime regressions. Given the definitions of the
variables, this implies that raising the percentage share of
the local population who are asylum seekers (A8 migrants)
by x% increases (reduces) the property crime rate by
1.09x% (0.39x%). The size of the asylum population in the
average local authority was of course very low over our
sample period. Across all England and Wales, it averaged
0.1% of the local adult population, so the average property
crime rate might be 0.11% higher as a result—only around
4% of the average property crime rate of around 2.7%. Of
course, some authorities had appreciably more asylum see-
kers located in the area, though shares larger than 1% of the
local population were extremely rare. For the A8 migrants,
the average share was 0.6%, so the average property crime
rate might be 0.23% lower as a result—around 8% of the
average property crime rate.
IV. Arrests, Incarceration, and Victimization
In this section we provide a range of supporting evidence
to the conclusion reached in the previous section regarding
the crime effects of the two immigrant waves. We begin
with some specially collected data on arrests by nationality
that shed some light on the likelihood that A8 immigrants
interact with the police. We then turn to some national evi-
dence on incarceration that is consistent with the conclusion
that any rise in crime occurred as a result of the asylum
wave rather than the A8 wave. Finally, we present evidence
on immigrant victimization to ensure that any crime effects
are not a result of increased crime against immigrants.
There appears to be no evidence for such a conclusion.
TABLE 5.—OLS AND IV PANEL REGRESSIONS FOR MALE AND FEMALE ASYLUM WAVE
Violent Violent Violent Violent Property Property Property Property
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D(Female Asylum/Pop) 0.726 1.103 0.135 0.669
(0.473) (0.563) (0.788) (0.950)
D(Male Asylum/Pop) 0.343 0.529 1.537*** 2.106***
(0.247) (0.373) (0.374) (0.510)
Dln(Pop) 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
D(Benefit Rate) 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.133*** 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.125***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
D(Young Share) 0.030 0.028 0.035 0.034 0.054 0.049 0.052 0.051
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)
Year dummies x x x x x x x x
PFA dummies x x x x x x x x
Sample size 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591 2,591
R2 0.278 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.275 0.274 0.292 0.290
Regressions are run over the period 2002–2009. The dependent variable is D(Number of Crimes Recorded/Adult Population). All regressions are weighted by adult population. The instrumental variables are the
number of asylum seekers in dispersal accommodation for the asylum wave (by gender). The F-statistic on the first-stage IV in the asylum regression is 5,476 (p ¼ 0.000) for female asylum seekers and 1,345 for male
asylum seekers (p ¼ 0.000) (see Table A2). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the local authority level. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
17 See, among others, Card (2001), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Bianchi
et al. (2012), Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013), Cortes (2008), and
Gonza´lez and Ortega (2011).
18 If we simply split the local authorities into two equal groups based on
the proportion of A8 migrants in the local population and examine the
change in property crime rates over the period, we find that rates declined
by 1.0 point (from 2.8 to1.8) in the low-A8 group and 1.4 points (from
3.6 to 2.2) in the high-A8 group. The A8 shares of the population in the
two groups in 2008 were 0.7% and 2.5%, respectively. On most other
metrics, the two groups had similar prewave characteristics so it would be
hard to believe that A8 migrants generated a rise in property crime rates.
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A. Arrests
Data on arrests by nationality are not collected or pub-
lished in the United Kingdom. However, we can provide a
little more evidence on the A8 wave by comparing arrest
rates by nationality that were specially collected by us from
every police force in the country (see the online appendix
for more details). These data are available only from 2004
at the level of police force area and for a subsample of
police forces. In table 6, we pool the data for all years and
police forces and estimate the relationship between the
share of A8 arrests in total arrests and the share of A8 citi-
zens in the local population. A coefficient of 1 would be
consistent with no differential effect of A8 citizens on local
arrest rates. However, this is not a strong test, since any
estimate is consistent with some pattern of differential
arrest propensities across natives and A8 citizens irrespec-
tive of criminal activity. The results are, however, consis-
tent with this neutrality. In column 1 we estimate a slightly
larger coefficient than 1, but in column 3, we restrict the
sample to data points that are consistently reported, and the
coefficient is insignificantly different from 1.19 Similar
results are obtained when we focus on the smaller sample
that isolates arrests for property crimes.
B. Incarceration
An alternative approach is to focus on incarceration
rather than reported crime. The main advantage of this
approach is that we have data on the nationality of prisoners
so that we can more directly link the immigration flows
from particular countries to incarceration rates. Unfortu-
nately, such data are available only at the national level, so
we will be identifying the link between the asylum and A8
waves and imprisonment by comparing the evolution of
incarceration rates for the set of countries providing the
flows to the incarceration rates of natives and of citizens of
countries not involved in the two waves we focus on. In
consequence, this analysis is susceptible to the criticism
that we identify the asylum wave effect using nationality
even though the majority of such nationals were unlikely to
be asylum seekers. To mitigate this, we focus on only the
five largest asylum seeker nationalities but recognize that
this analysis can at best only be considered supportive of
the previous results. The A8 results are less prone to this
criticism as the wave that arrived after the 2004 enlarge-
ment dominates the stock of A8 citizens in the United
Kingdom.
We can graphically illustrate the results for our two
immigrant waves of interest. We generate an asylum and an
A8 incarceration rate by weighting each nationality’s incar-
ceration rate each year by the share of that nationality in the
flow associated with the two immigrant waves. These flow
shares are average estimates for the period 1997 to 2002 for
the asylum wave20 and 2004 to 2007 for the A8 wave. We
then examine the trend in these incarceration rates before
and after the waves occur relative to both the native incar-
ceration rate and the incarceration rate of all immigrants
from countries not included in the asylum or A8 wave.
Because we have data from 1993 to 2008, we are able in
both cases to examine prewave trends to ensure that our
results are not driven by differential trends that existed
before the large flows occurred. Figures 4A and 4B show
the trends for the two immigrant waves. It is clear that the
incarceration rates for the asylum wave rose rapidly as the
size of the group expanded in the late 1990s and early
2000s in absolute terms and relative to the incarceration
rates of both foreigners from nonasylum countries and Brit-
ish citizens. The rise began to tail off toward the end of the
sample period. In contrast, the trend in incarceration rates
for the A8 nationals almost exactly mirrored the trend for
British citizens from 2004, suggesting no obvious impact of
this wave on prison populations.
More formally, we can estimate the following model of
incarceration:
IncarcerationRateit ¼ Ii þ Tt þ hWaveDummyit þ lit:
ð2Þ
In equation (2), the WaveDummy variable takes the value 1
for the immigrant wave observations for all years from the
start of the relevant immigration wave (1997 for the asylum
wave and 2004 for the A8 wave) and is 0 for the earlier
years and for the comparison group. We also control for the
group fixed effect and time fixed effects. A positive coeffi-
cient y indicates a relative rise in incarceration rates follow-
ing the immigrant wave. Results are given in table 7. Con-
sistent with the evidence from the charts, we find a
significant jump in the incarceration rates of the asylum
wave nationalities after 1997, with rates 0.15 percentage
TABLE 6.—ARREST RATES BY NATIONALITY, A8 WAVE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A8 share in population 1.250** 1.040** 1.148** 1.026**
(0.099) (0.243) (0.162) (0.266)
All crimes x x
Property crimes x x
Clean sample x x
Sample size 90 57 71 50
R2 0.684 0.460 0.709 0.476
Regressions are run over the period 2004–2008. The dependent variable is the share in total arrests of
A8 citizens. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the PFA level. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
19 To identify the clean sample, we make use of information provided
from the relevant police force. For example, a number of forces report
that some of the data, particularly in the first two years of our sample,
were collected on only an ad hoc basis and that many arrest records have
no nationality recorded. Such data points are excluded from the clean
sample.
20 For the asylum wave, we focus on only the largest five countries in
terms of flow. For the period 1997–2002, these are, in order of contribu-
tion, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.
They represent 40% of applications over the period.
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points higher than the nonasylum immigrant control group.
This is in addition to an average 0.06 percentage point
higher incarceration rate. The estimated effects for the A8
group are insignificantly different from 0 when compared to
the British control group and are actually negative com-
pared to the non-A8 immigrant control group. We conclude
that the asylum wave led to a rise in incarceration rates for
nationals of countries who were disproportionately repre-
sented in the asylum wave relative to both natives and other
immigrants, whereas the A8 wave had no discernible effect
on the prison population. To the extent that there are more
people in prison from A8 countries, this is simply a result
of the massive rise in the size of those populations in the
United Kingdom rather than evidence of increased incar-
ceration rates.21
C. Victimization
As discussed in section III, we are also able to consider
whether there is any evidence of higher crime victimization
for the two immigrant waves. We use data from both the
British Crime Surveys from 2004 to 2008 and the New Deal
for Communities Surveys from 2002 and 2004. The former
is used for official victimization statistics and is a large
representative sample of the U.K. population. The identifi-
cation of the immigrant waves is by country of birth and
year of arrival in the United Kingdom. This is not proble-
matic for the A8 wave, but the measurement of the asylum
wave has the problems of misidentification discussed in
section II. To address this issue we use the second data set,
which can explicitly identify asylum applicants from other
non-British immigrants. Fortunately, the data contain simi-
lar questions on victimization as those used in the British
Crime Survey. Neither data set is sufficiently large to
enable analysis to be conducted at the local authority level.
Table 8 shows the percent of individuals reporting that
they have been a victim of crime in the twelve months up to
the survey date. Victimization rates are reported for U.K.-
born natives, the asylum wave, the five largest asylum
countries, the A8 wave, and other non-U.K.-born indivi-
duals. Reassuringly, the data from both sources provide a
similar picture, with both asylum and A8 waves having
lower crime victimization rates than natives.
Table 9 shows statistical models of the probability of
being victimized that condition on additional survey vari-
ables. For the British Crime Survey, the key finding of table 8
remains intact: crime victimization is significantly lower for
the two migrant waves we consider. For the New Deal Sur-
vey, we find that lower victimization rates for asylum see-
kers in the raw data are eliminated when controls are added,
such that rates appear to be essentially the same as those for
natives.22
In summary, the results seem to suggest that differential
changes in crime rates during the immigrant waves cannot
be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. There is little
empirical work on the factors affecting rates of crime and
victimization against immigrants. For example, Krueger
and Pischke (1997) find little evidence that crimes against
immigrants in Germany can be explained by either eco-
nomic variables or the relative number of immigrants
within a locality. They do, however, find substantial differ-
TABLE 7.—DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF INCARCERATION RATES
Asylum Wave A8 Wave
Comparison Group Comparison Group
Nonasylum
Foreign
Nationals British
Non-A8
Foreign
Nationals British
Wave dummy 0.150** 0.200*** 0.078*** 0.018
(0.059) (0.063) (0.029) (0.040)
Group dummy 0.062 0.149** 0.129*** 0.013
(0.051) (0.055) (0.016) (0.022)
R2 0.744 0.829 0.865 0.227
Regressions are run over the period 1993–2008. Wave dummy equals 1 for the asylum/A8 group after
the relevant wave begins and 0 before. Group dummy equals 1 for the asylum/A8 group and 0 for the
comparison group. All regressions include the full set of time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at **5% and ***1%.
FIGURE 4.—INCARCERATION RATES, 1993–2008
21 The number of prisoners from A8 countries rose from 145 in 2003 to
906 in 2008. This still represents only about 1% of the prison population.
It should also be noted that the A8 prison population in years prior to the
A8 wave was very small, which explains the volatility in incarceration
rates for this group in the early years of the sample, as shown in figure
4B.
22 It should be noted that we have fewer control variables available in
the second data set.
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ences between West and East Germany in the rate of crimes
against foreigners.
V. Interpretation and Discussion
The reported results very much highlight the importance
for crime participation of the different labor market pro-
spects of the two migration waves we study. A natural inter-
pretation of these results is in terms of the orthodox eco-
nomic model of crime participation introduced by Becker
(1968) and further developed by Ehrlich (1973) and others
(see Freeman, 1999, for a review). In this model, indivi-
duals rationally choose between crime and legal labor mar-
ket work depending on the potential returns each offers.
The ‘‘returns’’ from crime are calculated relative to the
probability of getting caught and the expected sanction if
caught and compared to labor market earnings from
employment. If the former outweighs the latter, an indivi-
dual will engage in crime.
Formally, individuals choose between criminal and legal
activity by comparing the expected utility from each. If
U(W) is the utility from working at a legal wage W, U(WC)
the utility from a successful (that is, not caught) crime
where p is the probability of being caught, and S the mone-
tary-equivalent sanction if caught,23 then an individual
decides to engage in criminal activity if
ð1 pÞUðWcÞ  pUðSÞ > UðWÞ: ð3Þ
The usefulness of this framework for interpreting our
results comes from the key prediction that relative labor
market opportunities matter (there is good evidence from
elsewhere supporting this; see Gould, Weinberg, & Mus-
tard, 2002, and Machin & Meghir, 2004). People without a
job (where W ¼ 0) are more likely to participate in crime.
So are those where the formal wage W is low relative to
WC.
It is evident from the discussion in section II (about
tables 1A and 1B) that these crime-predicting features (low
TABLE 9.—VICTIMIZATION EQUATIONS, PR(CRIME VICTIM IN LAST YEAR)
British Crime Survey, 2004–2008 New Deal Evaluation, 2002–2004
Asylum 0.142*** 0.047 0.032
(0.044) (0.054) (0.054)
Asylum wave largest five 0.054** 0.073*** 0.076***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
A8 0.077*** 0.152*** 0.155***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Other 0.005 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.178*** 0.005 0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Police force area No No Yes No No Yes
Sample size 141,164 141,164 141,164 23,725 23,725 23,725
Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Control variables for the BCS regressions are age, gender, student, education (nine categories), urban/rural (eight categories), housing tenure (eight cate-
gories), number of children (ten categories), household income (fifteen categories), marital status (five categories), years at accommodation (five categories), ethnicity (five categories), and nationality within the
United Kingdom (five categories). Years run from 2004 to 2008, and there are 42 police force areas. Control variables for the New Deal regressions are age, gender, education (six categories), region (nine categories),
household income (nine categories), housing tenure (three categories), years at accommodation (six categories), household size (five categories), household composition (four categories), ethnicity (three categories),
employment status (three categories), and English language ability. Significant at **5% and ***1%.
TABLE 8.—VICTIMIZATION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. British Crime Survey, 2004–2008
United
Kingdom
Asylum
Wave
Asylum Wave, Largest
Five Countries
A8
Wave
Other Non-United
Kingdom
Sample
Size
Crime Victim in last year (%) 31.6 22.5 22.4 25.5 29.8 141,164
B. New Deal Evaluation, 2002–2004
United
Kingdom Asylum Nonasylum
Sample
Size
Crime Victim in Last Year (%) 35.4 31.0 29.6 23,725
Panel A from pooled British Crime Survey data (2004–2005 to 2007–2008 waves). The Asylum Wave percentages are weighted to reflect asylum shares as with earlier tables. The largest five asylum wave coun-
tries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. Panel B from pooled National Evaluation of the New Deal for Communities data (2002 and 2004 waves).
23 One might wonder about the severity of sanctions on migrants. In
general, migrants receive the same penalties as natives. However after a
sentence has been served, migrants are liable to deportation from the Uni-
ted Kingdom. Section 32 of the 2007 U.K. Borders Act requires the secre-
tary of state to issue a deportation order against any foreign national con-
victed of a criminal offense and imprisoned for at least twelve months.
However, section 33 makes clear that such an order cannot be given if
doing so would violate U.K. obligations under the UN Refugee Conven-
tion or the European Convention on Human Rights. In other words, if an
asylum seeker was eventually determined to be a legitimate claimant, he
or she would also be protected from deportation if he or she were sent to
prison.
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employment rates, high unemployment rates, and low
wages) are more marked for the asylum wave. Thus, it fol-
lows that to the extent that the model is relevant, this is the
group most likely to be connected to higher crime. The dif-
ference between the legal labor market opportunities of asy-
lum seekers and both natives and the A8 wave are actually
more extreme than suggested by table 1. Asylum seekers
are forbidden from working during the first six (extended to
twelve in 2002) months of their claim being initiated. After
this point, they can apply for permission to work until their
case is decided. Evidence from the Refugee Council (2005)
suggests that only about 10% of asylum seekers had been
waiting less than six months for their asylum decision,
while a third had been waiting over two years. Hence, the
stock of asylum seekers is made up of a combination of
those with no permission to work and claiming assistance
from the state and those who are entitled to work because
of the delays in reaching a final decision on their asylum
claim. In addition, the level of benefits paid to asylum see-
kers is very low relative to other welfare benefits. For
example, the weekly subsistence payment made to single
adult asylum seekers in 2009 was £35.52 compared to
£65.45 for those receiving unemployment benefits.24
What about the findings for different sorts of crimes?
People usually associate the Becker-Ehrlich model with
property crimes, and so the prediction of increased crime
for the asylum wave due to less favorable labor market
opportunities should be more strongly connected to this
kind of crime. Intuitively, violent crime seems less sensible
to consider in this way, especially in the context of immi-
gration waves. While a small literature (for example, Grog-
ger, 2000) does extend the Becker-Ehrlich model to violent
crime through violence being complementary to drug
crimes in the United States, this seems less appropriate to
the context we study where economic differences are likely
to be central to the crime-work decision. This is indeed
what our results show, with there being no violent crime
effects and the property crime effects for the asylum wave
being associated with low labor force participation rates,
high unemployment, and low wage levels.
Using the economic model of crime to understand the
links between immigrant inflows and crime also helps us to
understand the evidence from the United States and how it
connects to our findings.25 Butcher and Piehl (1998a,
1998b) show that city-specific crime rates do not rise in
response to immigrant inflows and that immigrants have
lower rates of incarceration than natives in the United
States. Since nearly all immigrants in the United States
come to work, they are perhaps most similar to the A8
migrants that we consider. Spenkuch (2011) shows that for
a panel of U.S. counties, there is an economically meaning-
ful impact of immigration on crime. Crucially, however,
and consistent with our results, these effects are present
only for immigrants who are likely to have poor labor mar-
ket opportunities.
VI. Conclusion
There is much popular commentary on the supposed
links between immigration and crime but a notable paucity
of credible empirical evidence about the relationship. This
paper has sought to fill some of this gap with an analysis on
the response of crime rates to two very different immigra-
tion waves that hit the United Kingdom over the past ten to
fifteen years. Our view is that the scale of these waves, their
timing, and their very different characteristics make them
suitable for the empirical analysis of crime and immigra-
tion.
We report results from an array of data sources and
empirical methods that we argue are in line with key predic-
tions from the canonical Becker/Ehrlich model of crime
participation. For property crime, we find that crime rates
are significantly higher in areas in which asylum seekers
are located but that they are lower for the A8 wave. This
conclusion is robust when we control for the endogeneity of
location choice and for local crime trends within the police
force area. In contrast, for both waves, we can find no sig-
nificant relationship between immigrants and violent crime.
The same picture emerges when we explore the time series
evolution of incarceration rates, which suggests a rise in the
rate of incarceration of foreigners from asylum seeker coun-
tries as the asylum wave arrived in the United Kingdom,
but no such rise for A8 foreigners as that wave arrived.
Finally, we show that the results are hard to explain on the
basis that the rise in crime may be a result of crime against
immigrants. Interestingly we find that victimization rates
are in fact lower against the two waves than for natives in
general.
Though we find consistently positive effects from the
asylum wave on property crime, the average size of the
effect is not substantial. However, some areas received sub-
stantial inflows of asylum seekers and were therefore likely
to have experienced more significant property crime rises.
From a policy perspective, this suggests that more attention
should perhaps have been focused on the potential localized
crime risks involved in the concentrated dispersal policy
adopted by the authorities but that national crime rates were
unlikely to have been strongly influenced by the arrival of
the asylum wave.
Our results also suggest that focusing on improving the
limited labor market opportunities of asylum seekers has
24 Clearly, differences in policy treatment once in the destination coun-
try may not be the whole story. Criminal behavior between the two waves
may also differ because the selection process that led these immigrants to
the United Kingdom is not necessarily similar. Due to the endogeneity of
the migration decision (Borjas, 1987), the two groups may substantially
differ in their unobservables (the ‘‘quality’’ of migrants) and therefore in
their potential returns in both legal and criminal labor markets. We do not
speculate on the nature of these selection processes. When interpreting
the findings of this paper, one needs to bear in mind that a differential
criminal behavior between members of the two waves may have been
observed even if they had been subject to an identical policy regime.
25 See Bell and Machin (2012) for a comprehensive review of the
empirical evidence on the link between crime and immigration.
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scope to generate crime reductions, in addition to generat-
ing potential cost savings in terms of benefits. Since we are
(rightly) obliged to consider all applications for asylum, it
makes sense to allow applicants to seek work while their
applications are being considered, particularly given the
long duration that final decisions on such applications can
take. In addition, job training and language courses are
likely to be particularly beneficial for such migrants. Such
an approach could potentially significantly tilt the labor
market opportunities of migrants relative to illegal activ-
ities. The disadvantage of such an approach is the risk that
it signals to potential migrants that asylum application
could be used as a method of seeking work in the United
Kingdom rather than as a route for those fleeing persecu-
tion.
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